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Roy Jenkins and the Importance of Top Level Politics 
 
N. Piers Ludlow 
 
 
Roy Jenkins’ direct involvement with the process of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) in Europe was remarkably short, lasting little more than 18 months.  Indeed, 
the period when he was, arguably, the key figure in kick-starting the revival of interest 
in the issue that would culminate in the launch of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979 was shorter still, being only the seven months from his own decision 
in July 1977 that EMU should be the Commission’s number one goal, to Helmut 
Schmidt’s surprise revelation in February 1978 that the Germany Chancellor intended 
to make the issue his own priority.  Unlike several of the other figures examined in 
this book, therefore, Jenkins was not someone for whom EMU was a linking thread 
running through much of their professional career.  It was merely something on which 
he focused, intensely and to some effect, for a short period of a lengthy and 
distinguished career.   
 Furthermore, and again in contradistinction to several of those who we are 
discussing elsewhere in this volume, Roy Jenkins had comparatively little training in 
academic economics and as such was ill-placed to contribute much to the highly 
technical debate about what exactly EMU might look like and precisely what getting 
there would entail.  Instead his contribution was essentially political, focused on the 
relative priority accorded to EMU as against other European policy goals, the manner 
in which this goal should be pursued, and the level of government and of European 
policy making at which the subject could most fruitfully be debated.  His presence 
amongst the figures we will be discussing is almost certainly justified; but it is 
justified as a reminder that the quest for EMU has never just been a highly complex 
discussion amongst experts on international finance and macro-economics about the 
feasibility or desirability of moving towards a single currency. Rather it has also 
involved a highly political set of choices often made by national and European leaders 
with little time for, or expertise in, the finer details of macro-economic argument, but 
motivated by the shared conviction that EMU could be a highly effective instrument 
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for attaining a long-cherished political goal, namely the greater integration and unity 
of Europe.  
 This chapter will begin with a short sketch of Roy Jenkins’ life and career 
prior to his arrival in Brussels.  From this it should become apparent that while 
Jenkins had acquired quite a lot of experience of how disruptive and damaging 
exchange rate volatility could be and a degree of hands-on experience of dealing with 
international macro-economic issues, he had next to no track record on EMU itself 
before becoming Commission President.  It is not therefore particularly surprising that 
he would identify EMU as something he wanted to work towards only once he was 
installed in the Berlaymont building in Brussels. 
 A second section will then examine why he decided to espouse the goal of 
EMU before plunging into an analysis of that brief, but important, period when 
Jenkins became the most important and active advocate of European monetary 
integration.  This will involve tracing the origins of his ideas, exploring their content, 
looking at the manner in which they were put forward, and assessing their 
effectiveness.  The section will then conclude with an account of how Jenkins 
gradually lost control of the dossier that he had helped revitalise and became little 
more than a cheer leader for efforts primarily carried out by others.  A third and final 
section will then gauge the overall impact of Jenkins’ contribution on the broader 
EMU story.  It will suggest that his brief involvement did matter, but more for his 
views on the politics of the EMU quest than as a source of economic ideas.  Jenkins 
did little to increase the sum of European knowledge about how EMU might work or 
the precise economic or political steps needed in order to bring it about.  Few of his 
ideas are directly traceable forward into the EMS as it eventually emerged, still less 
into more recent steps towards monetary union.  But his key insights were that EMU 
firstly was something that could not be obtained through too gradual and cautious a 
process but instead required a high degree of political commitment and will, and 
secondly, that if it was to happen it would be the product of mobilization at the 
highest level of European governance rather than just discussion amongst monetary 
experts or ministers of finance.  Both of these assessments would be borne out not just 
by the manner in which the EMS was created, but also by the launching of the single 






Roy Jenkins was born in south Wales, the son of a coal miner, trade union official, 
and later Labour MP.  His roots were thus in a strong working class Labour heartland, 
but he also had close ties to the upper reaches of the Labour Party from childhood.  
Clement Attlee, then Deputy Prime Minister, was for instance a close friend of his 
father and would be witness at Roy Jenkins’ wedding in 1945.  And this privileged, 
almost patrician aspect of his background, was reinforced by an educational trajectory 
that took him from a local welsh secondary school to Balliol College, Oxford where 
he was a contemporary of Denis Healey and Tony Crosland, and a year or so below 
Edward Heath.  At Oxford he read PPE, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, this last 
being taught, at Balliol, by Thomas Balogh, later an advisor to the Labour 
governments of the 1960s in which Jenkins would serve and an energetic opponent of 
Jenkins on the question of EEC membership in particular.  From his memoir account, 
a huge amount of Jenkins’ time at university was spent in student politics, in the 
Oxford Union, in the University Labour Club, and then in the Oxford University 
Democratic Socialist Club which he helped to found, but despite or perhaps because 
of this he was able enough to emerge with one of the four Firsts (out of the fifty or so 
taking the subject) in PPE awarded that year.  This underlying ability was then 
confirmed by Jenkins’ military service during the Second World War where after a 
brief interlude serving in an artillery battery on the home front he was selected as a 
cryptographer for work at Bletchley Park rather than seeing the type of active service 
on the front line experienced by Heath or Healey. (Jenkins, 1991, pp. 3–58) 
 After the war Jenkins embarked on a career in politics.  He stood 
unsuccessfully for election in 1945; made a fruitless bid to be selected as the Labour 
Party candidate for the seat formerly held by his father in 1946; and in 1948 was 
successfully elected as MP for Southwark, a London constituency, becoming in the 
process the ‘baby’ of the House of Commons – i.e. the youngest MP.  With the 
Southwark seat destined to disappear in a round of electoral reform, he was able to 
secure the Labour nomination to Stechford, in Birmingham, a seat that he won in the 
1950 General Election and was then to hold until 1977 when he became President of 
the European Commission.  A lengthy and distinguished career in British politics had 
begun.(Campbell, 2014, pp. 94–123) 
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 Within the Labour Party Jenkins was at first close to Attlee, and later emerged 
as a member of the inner circle of Hugh Gaitskell, the party leader from 1955 until his 
unexpected death in 1963.  As a Gaitskellite Jenkins was involved with a succession 
of major tussles with the left of the party, notably that over unilateral disarmament in 
1960 and 1961.  He was also a member of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism, a 
pro-Gaitskell grouping that would involve many of Jenkins’ later allies in the 
formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the early 1980s. (Campbell, 2014, 
pp. 111–242) Between 1955 and 1957 he acquired his first taste of European politics, 
serving as a member of the Labour Party delegation to the Council of Europe during 
the very years that the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was being negotiated.  Of 
this baptism in European politics he would later write ‘I have no doubt that these 
experiences sowed the seeds of my subsequently persistent [European] 
conviction.’(Jenkins, 1991, p. 104)  And in parallel to his political activities, he was 
also able to become an acclaimed and successful biographer, publishing well-received 
and commercially lucrative studies of Herbert Asquith, Charles Dilkes, and Stanley 
Baldwin. (Cannadine, 2004)  
  Labour’s victory in the 1964 general election, ending thirteen years in 
opposition, made possible a first taste of ministerial responsibility for Jenkins, despite 
his somewhat problematical relationship with Harold Wilson, the new Prime Minister.  
His first post was as Minister for Aviation, a job in which he took a number of 
controversial decisions firmly and efficiently. (Campbell, 2014, pp. 243–258)  Then 
in 1965 he became Home Secretary, entering the Cabinet for the first time, and 
quickly acquiring a formidable reputation as a liberal-minded reformer.  During his 
three years at the Home Office, Jenkins helped oversee a relaxation of the divorce 
laws, the abolition of theatre censorship, the legalization of homosexuality and that of 
abortion.(Allen, 2004) In late 1967 he replaced James Callaghan as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, charged with restoring Britain’s economic position after repeated sterling 
crises and the November 1967 devaluation which General de Gaulle had used as a 
pretext for blocking the UK’s second application for EEC membership.(Parr, 2006)  
In this role too he was widely regarded as a major success.  His first two budgets in 
particular were seen as playing a major role in stabilising the pound and helping to 
restore British economic fortunes after the woes of 1966 and 1967.  And the manner 
in which he defended his actions, both in Parliament and in the press, marked him out 
as one of the most effective speakers and debaters of his generation.(Taverne, 2004) 
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As the 1970 general election approached, a contest Labour was widely expected to 
win, Jenkins was earmarked for the post of Foreign Secretary and also seemed heir 
apparent to the party leadership.  Being leader-in-waiting was all the more important 
given that Wilson had already let it be known to his inner circle that he intended to 
step down at some point well before the end of the next government.(Campbell, 2014, 
p. 357)  Number 10 Downing Street was tantalizingly close. 
 This ministerial trajectory was important for the EMU story in at least two 
respects.  The first was that it gave Jenkins direct experience of how ruinous exchange 
rate crises could prove and of the imperfections of world monetary arrangements.  No 
Cabinet minister under Wilson in the 1960s could fail to realise how many of 
Labour’s ambitious plans had fallen victim to the perennial weakness of sterling; 
Britain’s balance-of-payments and the vulnerability of its currency would prove the 
Achilles heel of the country throughout the 1960s but never more than in the middle 
of the decade.(Tomlinson, 2004) As Chancellor furthermore Jenkins became a 
participant not just in the battle to save the pound from further decline, but also in the 
fraught international discussions about monetary arrangements in the early stages of 
what would turn out to be the terminal decline of the Bretton Woods system.  He took 
part for instance in the November 1968 meeting in Bonn which is widely regarded as 
the moment when Germany’s position as the most financially sound of the Western 
powers was internationally recognised.(Jenkins, 1991, pp. 265–269) He hence had a 
painful awareness of how much difficulty such German strength could cause countries 
whose finances were less healthy.  Both the realisation of German centrality, and a 
sensitivity to the problems that this very centrality could cause for others, would later 
be apparent in Jenkins’ approach to EMU. 
 The second consequence of Jenkins’ ministerial service in the Wilson 
governments of the 1960s was to convince him still further both of the importance of 
European integration, and the necessity of Britain playing a full part in this process.  
Such views pre-dated his ministerial career.  As early as 1961 Jenkins had emerged as 
one of the most articulate Labour advocates of British membership, a stance that put 
him at odds with his party leader and mentor Hugh Gaitskell.(Young, 1999, pp. 150–
151 & 161–164) Jenkins had thus been unhappy with Labour’s 1962 decision to 
qualify its support for British membership with a series of pre-conditions deliberately 
intended to be unobtainable.  But in the mid-to-latter stages of the Wilson 
governments he had had the gratifying spectacle of seeing opinion in the cabinet, if 
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not necessarily in the wider party, swing decisively back in his direction.  Jenkins had 
thus been able to lend an important and powerful voice to the pro-European cause in 
the crucial cabinet debates that were to decide on Labour’s 1967 membership 
application.(Wall, 2012, pp. 187–200) 
 This forceful pro-European stance would, however, do much to contribute to 
Jenkins’ downfall as a Labour politician once the party unexpectedly lost the 1970 
general election to Edward Heath.  For in opposition, the bulk of the party including 
the former Prime Minister, Wilson, and Jenkins’ greatest rival, James Callaghan, 
turned against an application that the Wilson government had initiated and which a 
new Wilson government would undoubtedly have pursued had the electoral outcome 
been different, leaving Jenkins and those others who remained consistent in their pro-
European stance increasingly vulnerable to attack.(Kitzinger, 1973, pp. 276–330) In 
October 1971 this led to the unusual spectacle of Jenkins as Labour Party deputy 
leader, heading a group of 69 rebels, who defied a party three-line whip to vote in 
favour of the government’s European Community Bill, the legislation accepting the 
membership terms negotiated by Heath’s government – a rebellion without which the 
legislation would not have passed.(Kitzinger, 1973, pp. 371–374) By 1972 Jenkins 
had resigned the deputy leadership, in protest against his party’s decision to promise a 
referendum on British membership.(Jenkins, 1991, pp. 338–349) And in 1975 Jenkins 
would serve as the leader of the ‘yes’ campaign in the eventual referendum, working 
much more closely with opposition politicians like Heath, Willie Whitelaw or Jo 
Grimond than he did with Harold Wilson who was now back as Prime Minister but 
who had decided to play a semi-detached role in the referendum campaign.(Jenkins, 
1991, pp. 399–418) Disillusionment with Labour’s European policy hence played a 
key role in Jenkins’ progressive detachment from his party, ruining any residual hopes 
of becoming party leader, but also making him feel less and less committed to its 
fortunes and ever more out of step with its priorities.(Campbell, 2014, pp. 397–419)  
It was this state of semi-detachment – despite having returned to the government and 
resumed his former role of Home Secretary - that helps explain Jenkins’ 1976 
decision to accept the offer of becoming Commission President.  As he later 
explained, his initial reaction upon the opening being mentioned by Wilson was to 
refuse.   
Over the next few days I became increasingly doubtful of the wisdom of this 
reply.  Brussels would certainly be an escape from the nutshell of British 
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politics.  It would be an opportunity to do something quite new for me and in 
which I believed much more strongly than in the economic policy of Mr 
Healey, the trade union policy of Mr Foot, or even the foreign policy of Mr 
Callaghan.  There might also be the chance to help Europe regain the 
momentum which it had signally lost since the oil shock at the end of 
1973.(Jenkins, 1989, p. 4) 
 
Jenkins did put his hat into the ring in the battle to succeed Wilson.(Campbell, 2014, 
pp. 457–62)  But when he did poorly in the party leadership ballot, trailing both 
Michael Foot and Callaghan, the eventual winner, he was able to turn away from 
British politics and embark upon a new European career. 
 
Choosing EMU 
There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Jenkins arrived in Brussels having 
identified EMU as a key priority.  European monetary integration was not a subject on 
which he had much of a track record.  He had, it was true, briefly discussed EMU in 
his final months as Chancellor of the Exchequer, travelling in February 1970 to Paris, 
where he assured his then French counterpart, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, that once 
inside the EEC Britain would be willing to play its part in any monetary Europe that 
was created.(Wall, 2012, p. 348) The loss of office in the summer of that year had 
removed any need to follow up on this pledge.  It was also the case that as chair of the 
Labour Committee for Europe he had endorsed a 1971 report on the Werner proposals 
prepared by one of those who had served with him at the Treasury in the late 1960s, 
Dick Taverne.(Taverne, 1971) In welcoming its publication, Jenkins described the 
study to The Guardian as ‘the first serious attempt by any serious politician in this 
country to evaluate the implications of the Werner proposals especially in relations to 
sterling and its reserve role.’ (The Guardian, April 16, 1971) Press reports also 
confirm the international reputation for financial acumen that Jenkins had acquired as 
Chancellor, suggesting that he was the preferred candidate of several countries, 
including West Germany, for the position of IMF Managing Director when this 
became vacant in 1973 – an offer he turned down. (The Guardian, May 21, 1973) But 
there is little sign of him having intervened any further on the subject of EMU during 
the early or mid-1970s.  Indeed a search through the press records and the collection 
of his speeches preserved amongst his personal papers unearths only two public 
speeches on monetary themes made by Jenkins in the years between 1970 and his 
arrival in Brussels, both in 1973.  In March of that year he told the Manchester branch 
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of the United Europe Association of ‘the urgent search for a new world monetary 
system’; two months later he underlined to a conference in Washington DC on US-
European relations the need to develop a new international monetary system based on 
a reserve currency that was neither the US dollar nor any European currency. (The 
Guardian, March 17, 1973 & May 27, 1973) Direct remarks about Europe’s struggle 
to create its own monetary system are, by contrast, notable by their absence. 
 Nor does the paper work accumulated during the months prior to his arrival in 
the Berlaymont suggest any particular interest in monetary matters.  Jenkins was the 
first Commission President to be appointed a full six months before taking up office, 
and therefore had longer to prepare for the job than any of his predecessors.  The fact 
that one of his first actions on accepting the job was to recruit an extremely efficient 
British diplomat, Crispin Tickell, to run his private office (and later to become his 
chef de cabinet), also means that historians have a very thorough record of Jenkins 
activities during these preparatory months now preserved at All Souls College, 
Oxford.1  But references to EMU are few and far between.  There was a sub-folder 
labelled ‘Economic and Monetary Union’ which momentarily aroused my 
expectations.  It turned out however to contain a single letter from the British 
Treasury to Jenkins’ Private Secretary in the Home Office, referring to a call on 
Jenkins made by a Treasury official to outline British thinking on the subject, and 
enclosing a copy of a Treasury report.2 There was nothing else in the file to suggest 
that any follow up action had been taken, nor any indication that the views of other 
member states had been canvassed.  The other records from this preliminary period, 
with one exception, were equally mute on the subject.  The vast majority of the 
conversations that Jenkins and his team had, both with member state governments, 
and with multiple Brussels officials, appear to have centred on who should be 
appointed to the Commission, what portfolios they should hold, and how, if at all, the 
Commission might be reorganised and strengthened.  To the extent that actual policy 
priorities were discussed at all – and they were very much the exception rather than 
the rule – this tended to take the form of member state governments mentioning their 
preferences to Jenkins, rather than President-designate testing out his possible options.  
So the Dutch, Irish and Danish governments did briefly allude to monetary 
                                                 
1 Tickell papers, All Souls College, Oxford, Box 1 
2 Tickell papers, Box 1, ‘Economic and Monetary Union’, Baker to Phillips, 20.7.1976 
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integration, but Jenkins seems to have done no more than acknowledge their interest.3  
The only occasion on which discussion moved a little bit further was when the future 
President met the French Prime Minister, Raymond Barre.  But here too it appears to 
have been Barre who raised the subject rather than Jenkins.  The record of the meeting 
reads: 
M. Barre said that he had no immediate hope of economic and monetary 
union, but agreed with Mr Jenkins that it should be retained as a target. He still 
hoped for growing convergence of the economies of the member states of the 
Community. At the time of the Paris Summit of 1972 he had looked forward 
to the achievement of economic and monetary union relatively soon. But 
afterwards only the Germans had accepted the monetary disciplines that had 
been agreed by the Ministers of Finance among themselves at the same time.  
Since then the French economy had been very weak, and things had got out of 
hand in the run up to the last elections. Things had got worse since. 
 
A little later in their talk the conversation returned to monetary issues, with a brief 
discussion of the problem of sterling balances and Barre’s observation that a solution 
to this issue was only likely be found when the economic outlook improved.  ‘Mr 
Jenkins thought that the Community should be central to any such solution, and M. 
Barre agreed. It was vital that the Community countries should together align their 
currencies against the dollar. He agreed when Mr Jenkins said that he thought it was a 
mistake to float currencies.’4  
 This solitary exchange though offers little reason to alter the basic assessment 
that Jenkins did not arrive in Brussels with any concrete plans to make EMU a 
priority.  On the contrary, the fact that he was ready to give to François-Xavier Ortoli, 
the outgoing Commission President, who most unusually had agreed to stay on in 
Brussels, this time in a Vice Presidential capacity, the portfolio for economic and 
monetary affairs suggests that Jenkins at this point in time had no intention of acting 
on this issue.  After all, no politician as canny as Jenkins, would have placed his 
single strongest rival within the Commission in charge of a policy area that he 
planned to make his own.  The distribution of jobs in the new Commission thus 
confirms the basic message of the preliminary paper work: Jenkins took office in 
January 1977 with few clear priorities beyond the reform of the institution he had 
                                                 
3 Tickell papers, Box 1, ‘Netherlands. Visit to The Hague, 16-17 September’, Note for the Record, 
21.9.1976; ‘Visit to Dublin, 23 September 1976’, Note for the Record, Conversation with Mr Nally and 
Mr Keating: 24 September 1978; ‘Denmark’, Note of a meeting with Ivar Norgaard, Minister for 
Foreign Economic Affairs, and others, undated 
4 Tickell papers, Box 1, ‘France’, Record of a meeting between Mr Jenkins and the French Prime 
Minister, 1 November 1976 
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been placed in charge of, and most certainly with no blue-print or action programme 
in the economic and monetary field. 
 The archival record would therefore appear to confirm Jenkins’ own account 
of the timing of his turn towards EMU, namely that this occurred in the last two 
weeks of July 1977.(Jenkins, 1991, p. 463) The new President did not regard his first 
half year in office as having been particularly successful.  His main achievement, that 
of gaining access as of right to G7 meetings, had been achieved at the cost of serious 
damage to his relationship with French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, one of the 
sponsors of his appointment and a figure the Commission President could ill-afford to 
alienate.(Garavini, 2006) It was also hard immediately to gauge the importance of a 
victory that could still be called into question.  There was no immediate sense of 
satisfaction, moreover, given the rather unsatisfactory outcomes of the Downing 
Street summit and the petty humiliations to which the Commission President was 
subjected while there. As Jenkins noted dryly in his memoirs: ‘Extracting an 
invitation by stubborn complaint is rarely a recipe for enjoying the party.’(Jenkins, 
1991, p. 460) In addition, he had struggled to adapt to both the way in which the 
Commission itself functioned, and the working of other European institutions, 
particularly the European Parliament.(Jenkins, 1989, p. 63) More seriously perhaps he 
had found the departure from British politics more disruptive than expected, 
confessing to one colleague that he still dreamt of Westminster every night.5 And the 
state of European politics and the Community in general was dispiriting, with little 
sign of progress or European commitment in evidence amongst the member states.  
As he told the members of his cabinet as they assembled for a study day in early 
August at the President’s house in Oxfordshire: 
the first seven months in office had not been wholly satisfactory, though he 
felt that the achievements should not be minimised… But he thought that he 
had underestimated the complexities of Commission organisation and had not 
therefore fully worked out a “style of operation”. He said that the British 
Presidency of the Council had not helped (although its effects should not be 
exaggerated), and that although this situation would now be a little easier, 
most of the major difficulties would still remain, because not one of the four 
major powers was really prepared consistently to support the Community. 
What support there was came in varying degrees from Italy, and the five small 
countries. Certainly it was unlikely that the British would go into a very pro-
Europe gear for the moment.  Furthermore, no European statesman was 
prepared to “stick his neck out” over Europe. The role of the President as 
                                                 
5 Interview with David Marquand, June 7, 2011 
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simply an intermediary between governments was unsatisfactory, the 
Commission as a whole needed to set out a new and more “decisive policy”.6 
 
The campaign for monetary union was thus to serve as Jenkins’ ‘decisive policy’ and 
the issue of which he would ‘stick his neck out over Europe’ in a fashion that other 
European leaders were not prepared to do.  EMU was in other words to perform an 
analogous function to the Single Market programme under Jacques Delors, albeit with 
the important difference that whereas Jenkins turned to his galvanising policy only 
several months after he had arrived in Brussels, Delors had seemingly identified 
which option to pursue before he assumed office and had used his preliminary 
consultations in the six months prior to arrival to canvas member state views on the 
subject.(Grant, 1994, p. 66) 
 Why though did Jenkins decide to use EMU as his big new idea rather than 
some other area of Community policy?  There is virtually nothing in the archival 
record that I have seen to challenge the threefold explanation advanced by Peter 
Ludlow over thirty years ago.  He suggested that Jenkins motivations were first a 
belief that a debate about EMU would help Europe arrive at a strategy to address the 
problems of unemployment, inflation, and economic divergence; second a sense that 
monetary integration, if properly pitched, might tempt Germany into action; and third 
an awareness that a growing number of the member states, including the Belgians 
who were next to hold the Council presidency, might be receptive to a monetary 
initiative.(Ludlow, 1982, pp. 43–44) As far as the first point is concerned, it is 
confirmed by the records of meetings such as that with Barre cited above, or indeed a 
second meeting with the French Prime Minister in February 1977, that Jenkins had 
little patience with the monetary status quo.7 Furthermore, it is quite clear from the 
text of the Florence speech at which Jenkins would make public his ideas on monetary 
integration, and that of a follow up speech delivered in Bonn, that the Commission 
President saw EMU as a major step forward in the fight against both unemployment 
and inflation as well as, more obviously, a measure that would encourage economic 
                                                 
6 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Record of a 
meeting at East Hendred, 2 August 1977 
7 For the second meeting, see Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 
1976 to 1977’, Discussion between Mr Jenkins and M. Barre at the Hotel Matignon, 28 February 1977. 
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convergence between the member states.8  The same point about EMU being 
compatible with – and indeed supportive of – the fight against European 
unemployment had earlier been made by David Marquand at the East Hendred 
meeting in August; and was reiterated, at some length and with greater force in the 
paper written by Michael Emerson and presented by Jenkins to the special 
Commission meeting at La Roche-en-Ardenne in September.9  And it was also a point 
Jenkins argued strongly at the December European Council in Brussels, seeking to 
persuade Europe’s assembled leaders that a renewed push towards monetary union 
could be an important part of their response to the ongoing economic crisis.10  In 
making this case, which may look surprising in an era when monetary union has come 
to be widely associated with higher rather than lower unemployment, Jenkins and his 
advisors laid particular emphasis on the inefficacy of national macro-economic 
policies in 1970s Europe, and the corresponding prospect of much more effective 
macro-economic policy being exercised at a Community level.  This last would aid 
the fight against inflation, increase stability, and encourage business to invest, thereby 
creating new jobs.11 
The second idea, namely that Germany could be tempted to act, is harder to 
back up archivally.  Certainly neither of Jenkins’ two bilateral conversations with 
Schmidt in the first half of 1977, nor that with Hans Apel, the German Minister of 
Finance, provided much indication of the Federal Republic’s openness to a relaunch 
of monetary integration.12 But the archival record does demonstrate that Jenkins had 
taken note of the Franco-German statement of February 1977 when Giscard and 
Schmidt had reaffirmed their belief in the desirability of progress towards economic 
and monetary union, since he specifically raised the subject with Barre.13 Furthermore 
the whole text of the Bonn speech delivered in December was evidently designed to 
                                                 
8 The Florence speech of October 27, 1977 is available electronically through the archive of European 
integration hosted by Pittsburgh university at http://aei.pitt.edu/10983/ ; that delivered in Bonn, at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/10986/ 
9 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Record of a 
meeting at East Hendred, 2 August 1977; the Emerson/Jenkins paper is European Commission 
Archives (ECA), SEC (77) 3125/2, 16.9.1977. 
10 http://aei.pitt.edu/11005/ 
11 ECA, SEC (77) 3125/2, 16.9.1977 
12 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Summary 
record of a conversation between President Jenkins and Chancellor Schmidt: Chancellor’s Office, 
Bonn, 18 March 1977; Call by the President of the European Commission on the Federal German 
Chancellor, Chancellery, 12 May 1977; Call by the President of the European Commission on the 
Federal German Minister of Finance: Bonn, 12 May 1977 
13 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Discussion 
between Mr Jenkins and M. Barre at the Hotel Matignon, 28 February 1977. 
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appeal to a German audience, with multiple allusions to both the amount that the 
Federal Republic’s own experience and approach to economic governance could 
contribute to any European debate about EMU, and to the way in which an export 
orientated large economy like Germany could benefit from tighter monetary union.14   
Jenkins was also very aware of Schmidt’s profound dissatisfaction with the manner in 
which Carter was steering US macro-economic policy.  The Bonn speech thus went 
rather further than Jenkins’ previous statements about monetary union in highlighting 
the extent to which greater European monetary integration would lessen the global 
dominance of the US dollar and allow Europe to play ‘a major and perhaps decisive 
role in the restoration of order to the international monetary system.’15 And finally it 
is clear from the East Hendred record, that Jenkins originally envisaged this Bonn 
speech as the launch pad for his monetary ideas, again highlighting the centrality of 
Germany in his thinking.16  
The third claim, namely the likelihood of an EMU proposal gaining greater 
support from the member states than would have been the case prior to 1977, is rather 
easier to document.  As noted above, several states, including the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland had raised the issue in the course of Jenkins’ tour of the member 
state capitals in the autumn of 1976, without much initial response from the President-
designate.  The Dutch and the Irish both returned to the question when Jenkins visited 
once more in the spring of 1977, this time eliciting much more obvious interest and 
engagement from the President of Commission.17 The Franco-German declaration of 
February has already been noted, as has Jenkins’ conversation with Barre shortly 
afterwards.  And the Belgians, who were the next state to hold the Presidency, were 
widely known to be preparing to launch their own ideas to revivify EMU.(Ludlow, 
1982, pp. 44–45; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, pp. 132–134) The annex to the 
Jenkins/Emerson paper presented at Roche-en-Ardenne, outlining member states’ 
views on EMU, could thus afford to be cautiously optimistic.18 Only the British and 
the Bundesbank were expected to be wholly against.  Launching a major Commission 
                                                 
14 http://aei.pitt.edu/10986/ 
15 ibid. 
16 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Record of a 
meeting at East Hendred, 2 August 1977 
17 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’; Discussion 
between Mr Jenkins and members of the Dutch Government at The Hague, 21 March 1977 and Visit of 
the President of the Commission to Dublin, 19-20 May 1977 
18 SEC (77) 3125/2, 16.9.1977 
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initiative in this field would still be a gamble, but it would be one on which the odds 
were not massively discouraging. 
There is, however, one additional reason that Peter Ludlow overlooked and 
which was barely picked up by the much more recent Mourlon-Druol study, namely 
the link between EMU and enlargement.(Mourlon-Druol, 2012)  As Commission 
President, Jenkins was deeply committed to the expansion of Community membership 
to include Greece, Spain and Portugal. (Karamouzi, 2014)  To have done otherwise, 
he believed, would be to betray the new southern democracies at a point in their 
transition processes when each remained highly fragile.  But he was also highly 
conscious of the difficulties that enlargement might entail and of the way in which 
many feared that the incorporation of three much poorer new member states might 
paralyse the Community and thwart all prospects of forward movement.  Flanking 
enlargement with a bold policy initiative like EMU would hence serve to send a 
decisive signal to all involved in the integration process that widening and deepening 
could be pursued in parallel; that to allow the three applicant states to enter would not 
be to renounce all hopes of further integration.  Furthermore, Jenkins insisted, a 
Community strengthened by a bold bid for monetary integration would be better 
equipped to cope with the stresses and strains that the entry of three new member 
states would inevitably bring.  As the Commission President put it in another of his 
colourful metaphors, this time used both in bilateral conversations with Raymond 
Barre and James Callaghan and in his European Council statement, moving decisively 
towards EMU would provide the Community with the stronger bones and sinews that 
it would need to bear the weight of three additional and highly needy member states.19 
 
 
An original contribution? 
The extent to which member state views on the subject could already be mapped out 
well before the Jenkins’ initiative had been formally launched, only serves as a 
reminder of course of how much discussion there had already been about 
EMU.(Mourlon-Druol, 2012) In choosing monetary integration as his ‘big idea’ the 
                                                 
19 Tickell Papers, File 16, ‘Meetings and Conversations, September 1976 to 1977’; Record of a 
conversation between the President of the European Commission and the French Prime Minister at the 
Hôtel Matignon, Paris, November 19, 1977 & Record of a conversation between the President of the 
European Commission and the British Prime Minister, No. 10 Downing Street, London: 25 November 
1977; http://aei.pitt.edu/11005/ 
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Commission President was in a sense being profoundly unoriginal.  Just as would 
later be the case with Delors and his Single Market proposals, this repackaging of an 
old idea, was in most respects a major advantage.  Nobody could really criticise the 
European Commission for reproclaiming an objective to which all Community 
member states had been committed since the early 1970s.  Furthermore those like 
Michael Emerson who drafted Jenkins’ speeches could draw upon an extensive pre-
existing range of expert and political commentary on the theme.  And there was a 
ready-made coalition of enthusiasts likely to rally to the cause, even if there were also 
long-established enemies well dug into fortified positions of hostility. But it does also 
make important for an essay like this to identify what, if anything, was new and 
distinctive about Jenkins’ ideas.  Did the Commission President add to the ongoing 
monetary debate, or was he merely rehashing old ideas, extensively discussed 
beforehand? 
In terms of economic substance there was relatively little that was wholly new 
about Jenkins’ ideas.  Indeed, neither of his major speeches on the subject, that 
delivered in Florence and that given in Bonn, constitutes a clear set of proposals; 
instead they simply rehearse the arguments, economic and political, in favour of a 
rapid advance towards monetary union.  Nowhere in either is there a clear roadmap to 
get to EMU; nor does either outline in any kind of detail what exactly a monetarily 
integrated European Community would look like.  Their purpose, as the Florence 
speech makes clear, was simply to ‘re-launch a major public debate about what 
monetary union has to offer’.20 As such a significant portion of each brought up to 
date a series of fairly well known arguments in favour of monetary union and 
explained how EMU might prove an effective remedy to Europe’s current woes.  
Given the pressing nature of the economic difficulties afflicting the region during the 
mid-to-late 1970s this undeniably gave some potency and political relevance to the 
case advanced.  It was clearly of importance to ask why Europe seemed to be showing 
fewer signs of recovery from the economic crisis than either the United States or 
Japan, and there was some plausibility in the suggested link between such 
comparative underperformance and Europe’s fragmented economy.  Furthermore, as 
one Commission official was later to observe, ‘If monetary union is not presented in 
terms of current problems, politicians and public opinion will consider the subject as 
                                                 
20 http://aei.pitt.edu/10983/ 
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an obscure theological dispute, of interest to scholars but not to ordinary 
sinners.’(Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p. 160) But adding topical relevance to the call for 
EMU did not really require the fundamental economic case to be altered significantly.  
Indeed the only area where a much greater degree of detail could be added – 
especially in the Emerson/Jenkins paper for La Roche rather than in the two public 
speeches – was in the estimates of how great a level of fiscal transfer a monetary 
union might require, since on this Emerson was able to draw upon the recent findings 
of the MacDougall committee with which he himself had worked.(Commission of the 
European Communities, 1977) The Florence speech did therefore include reference to 
the 5-7% of Community GNP that the MacDougall group had estimated would be 
required for fiscal transfers within a full working monetary union.21  Despite the 
relative unoriginality of its economic content, however, there are at least three more 
political features of the Jenkins’ approach that do deserve to be highlighted.  
The first was the rejection of gradualism and the advocacy of a bold leap 
forward. Ever since the failure of the Werner Plan, Jenkins maintained, those in 
favour of monetary union had run scared of rapid advance. 
The concept of gradualism… has come to supplant more ambitious schemes. 
Some people seem to believe that we can back our way into monetary union; 
others that better coordination is all that is required.  I am afraid that neither 
view is right. The last few years have seen a retreat rather than an advance. In 
any event, the idea of an antithesis between gradual evolution and dramatic 
advance is misconceived. Evolution is a process which once begun goes both 
gradually and in jumps. There is room for tomorrow’s act of better 
coordination and for today’s discussion of a more ambitious plan for the day 
after tomorrow.  The process has to be seen as one. 
 
The new debate the Commission President called for therefore had to include 
elements of ambition and boldness, in place of the previous all-pervasive caution.22 
As the paper presented to the Commission at La Roche-en-Ardenne had put it, if 
advance towards EMU was to resume, ‘a decision is basically required whether or not 
to jump in at the deep end’.23 
 Second Jenkins insisted on the need to advance first on the monetary front 
rather than making any such progress conditional upon parallel steps towards other 
aspects of economic union.  The importance of this aspect of Jenkins’ plans can best 
be appreciated by comparing his ideas, as set out in the La Roche paper, with those 
                                                 
21 http://aei.pitt.edu/10983/ 
22 ibid.  Emphasis in the original. 
23 ECA. SEC (77) 3125/2, 16.9.1977 
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presented to the same meeting by Ortoli.  The French Commissioner’s contribution 
also focused on EMU.24 But whereas the Emerson/Jenkins paper envisaged bold 
advance on a narrow (if highly controversial and far-reaching) front, Ortoli’s draft 
presented a much more cautious set of steps in the monetary field – an extension of 
Community credit facilities, the greater use of the unit of account, the maintenance 
and reform of the Snake, possibly through the use of target zones, and the 
strengthening of FECOM – but situated them within a five year programme that 
would also comprise increased and more strictly policed economic convergence 
between member states, the completion of the Single Market by 1982, a series of 
measures designed to stimulate investment and address Europe’s energy needs, 
thereby enabling a return to growth, and the launch of a systematic European 
industrial policy.  For Ortoli, advance would thus be less rapid, but over a much wider 
policy range.  Emile Noël, the Commission Secretary General, made a valiant attempt 
to minimise the divergence between the two sets of views, recording in the minutes of 
the La Roche meeting that the ensuing discussion ‘indicated a significant convergence 
of views and suggested wide possibilities for a synthesis of M. Ortoli and Mr Jenkins’ 
ideas.’25 But rather more accurate was a later passage of the same set of minutes 
which spoke of ‘progress towards EMU (or to monetary union, if, as wished by some 
members of the Commission, this aspect was focused upon)’.26 Unlike Ortoli, Jenkins 
was in othernbh7 words suggesting a clear prioritization of the monetary over the 
economic aspects of EMU. 
 Third, Jenkins was absolutely clear in his own mind that the crucial level at 
which the debate that he desired on monetary integration was to take place was first 
and foremost that of the European Council.  This did not mean of course that a wider 
public discussion was not also useful, hence his public speeches on the topic.  Nor did 
the Commission President intend wholly to cut the ministers of finance and ECOFIN 
out of the loop.  A Commission paper on EMU trying to synthesise Jenkins’ and 
Ortoli’s approaches (although in reality rather closer to the latter than to the former) 
was duly submitted to ECOFIN in November 1977.(Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p. 147) 
Jenkins also explained and defended his ideas at an informal meeting of European 
foreign ministers at Villiers-le-Temple in early October.(Jenkins, 1989, p. 152) But 
                                                 
24 ECA. SEC (77) 3125, 15.9.1977 
25 ECA, COM (77) PV 442, 2e partie (séance du 18 septembre 1977). My translation. 
26 Ibid. 
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the audience that really mattered were Europe’s most senior decision makers who 
were next due to convene in Brussels in December.  In October, straight after 
delivering the Florence speech, Jenkins agreed with the Italian Prime Minister Giulio 
Andreotti that the European Council debate on the subject would be vital adding 
‘what was important for the Council was not just what went into it but what came out 
of it.’  In this respect he would like to see the Council conclusions ‘take the debate 
beyond mere exhortation’.27 To Schmidt, two weeks later, he was rather more 
defensive:  
Mr Jenkins referred to the forthcoming European Council. He said he did not 
expect the Chancellor to endorse ‘at a stroke’ his Florence ideas on monetary 
union, but he hoped that he would give them a fair run. He hoped that there 
would be no pouring of cold water or stamping on them.  Herr Schmidt said 
that the European Council was principally designed to present new 
perspectives. He was not against looking again at monetary union provided it 
was presented in reasonable as well as imaginative terms.28 
 
And with both Callaghan and Barre, the Commission President used the same phrase 
hoping for ‘a fair wind’ behind his ideas at the Council meeting.29 Jenkins’ statement 
to the Brussels European Council in December 1977 was hence absolutely vital, since 
it was addressed to the nine men without whose majority support no advance towards 
EMU would be conceivable.  In it Jenkins called for ‘a new, non-utopian but more 
urgent and contemporary impulse to the old idea of economic and monetary union, 
particularly its monetary aspect.’  This would be to the advantage of both the weaker 
and stronger economies within the EEC, he insisted.  It could not be attained ‘by an 
inevitability of gradualism in which everything happens painlessly, effortlessly, 
without any major act of political will.’  Nor should it await total ‘equality of 
economic performance’ since this was unlikely to be attained in ‘our lifetime or even 
our children’s lifetime.’ 
In this situation we need to look afresh at what monetary union would involve 
for the Community.  I should emphasise at the outset that I do not foresee such 
a union as something for tomorrow, or even the day after tomorrow.  But if we 
                                                 
27 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Meeting of 
President Jenkins with Prime Minister Andreotti, 28 October 1977 in Rome. 
28 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Summary 
record of a conversation between the President of the Commission and the Federal Chancellor over 
lunch in the Chancellor’s office, Bonn, 10 November 1977. 
29 Tickell papers, File 16, ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, Sept 1976 to 1977’, Record of a 
conversation between the President of the European Commission and the French Prime Minister at the 
Hotel Matignon, Paris, 19 November 1977 and Record of a conversation between the President of the 
Commission and the British Prime Minister, No. 10 Downing Street, London, 25 November 1977. 
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are to set ourselves an objective, it should be one within practical reach, 
something not over the horizon but at least on the horizon.  After all, in the 
long run we are all dead. What I envisage in the short run is the setting of an 
objective and the reorientation of our existing policies in terms of it. Thus 
when we take, as we must, decisions on major economic and monetary issues, 
we should do so in the framework of policies which will eventually lead to 
monetary union.  This is less than making for union in a straight line; but it is 
more than the coordination which is sometimes held up as sufficient for our 
current needs.30  
 
It was true of course that not even these three political choices made by 
Jenkins were entirely original.  The first and second – i.e. the plan to advance boldly, 
rather than gradually and to prioritise monetary over parallel economic measures – 
reprised the basic approach of the Werner Plan.(Gros and Thygesen, 1998, pp. 12–15. 
See also Danescu's chapter in this volume.) The Werner Plan had also been to some 
degree a child of summitry, the original call for monetary union having been issued at 
The Hague Summit of December 1969.(Hiepel, 2003) And the strategy of appealing 
to the still new European Council had been anticipated by the Commission’s April 
1976 paper on EMU which was addressed directly to the Community’s most senior 
decision-making body.(Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p. 93) But the timing of Jenkins’ 
initiative, the switch in tactics it represented from the gradualist approach championed 
by Ortoli, and the manner in which the Commission President was able to trail it in 
public, seek a degree of support bilaterally, and then sell it in a multilateral setting 
like the Council did make an important difference.  Apart from anything else, the fact 
that it was received in a positive, if non-committal fashion by most of Europe’s 
leaders in December 1977 (Jenkins recalled the Council giving ‘a fair if not 
tremendously enthusiastic wind behind our monetary union proposals’), helped 
demonstrate to Schmidt and Giscard that the circumstances might be favourable were 
they to decide, independently of Jenkins and for their own reasons, to set sail for the 
same destination.(Jenkins, 1989, p. 183) Similarly the relatively undefined nature of 
Jenkins’ ideas, both economically and institutionally, was an asset not a disadvantage, 
since it allowed the German and French leaders to make the ideas their own, without 
having to fundamentally denature them.  Jenkins did therefore perform a vital service 
to the duo of European leaders who would eventually do most to create the EMS. 
 Once Schmidt decided to act in February 1978, Jenkins quickly lost any 
control over the discussion that he had helped to revitalise.(Ludlow, 1982, p. 63 ff.; 
                                                 
30 http://aei.pitt.edu/11005/ 
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Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p. 151 ff.) It was flattering of course that the German 
Chancellor should choose to tell Jenkins of his monetary plans before any other 
international interlocutor.31 Given Schmidt’s notorious impatience with the European 
Commission the gesture of inviting Jenkins to Bonn and letting the Commission 
President know his determination to press ahead with monetary integration was both 
generous and revealing about the usefulness of Jenkins’ prior reconnaissance of the 
terrain.  But from the February meeting onwards, and still more from the Copenhagen 
Council in April in the aftermath of which the trilateral Schulmann-Clappier-Couzens 
discussions commenced and the details of the EMS began to be fleshed out, the 
Commission President became a supporting actor in a drama primarily carried 
forward by others, and played out on stages where he was not present.  He continued 
to be highly active of course, giving further speeches about EMU, intervening on the 
subject both bilaterally and at the Copenhagen, Bremen and Brussels Council, and at 
the G7 meeting in Bonn.(Jenkins, 1989, pp. 244–249, 286–290, 292–295 & 348–353) 
He also circulated a letter to all of the European leaders on the eve of the Copenhagen 
meeting, outlining the key tasks ahead, and reiterating the need for monetary 
advance.32 And in Bremen he may also have played a useful role in blunting 
Callaghan’s hostile questioning about the need for economic and monetary advance to 
proceed in parallel, supposedly largely by dint of reciting a strange piece of British 
doggerel.(Jenkins, 1991, p. 480) But even those who had worked closely with the 
Commission President on the issue would acknowledge that from the spring of 1978 
onwards Jenkins no longer had much control over the monetary union dossier.33 
Revealingly perhaps, his principal interest in the ‘concurrent studies’ that 
accompanied the latter stages of the EMS talks and which were designed to make it 
easier for countries with weaker economies to participate in the planned system, was 
not as a partial implementation of the ideas for fiscal stabilization that he had raised in 
his Florence speech, but instead as a political gesture which might increase the 
chances of Ireland and Italy joining the EMS. (Ludlow, 1982, p. 170ff.) 
 
 
                                                 
31 Tickell papers, File 17 ‘Records of Conversations and Meetings, 1978 to March 1979’, Record of a 
conversation between the President of the European Commission and the Federal German Chancellor, 
Bonn, 28 February 1978 
32 Tickell papers, File 15 ‘European Councils’, Jenkins’ Memorandum for the Copenhagen European 
Council, 5 April 1978. 
33 Interview with Michael Emerson, July 10, 2013. 
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Assessing Jenkins’ contribution 
So how important overall had Jenkins’ role been in the birth of the EMS?  And do his 
ideas have any relevance in the longer-term story of how the EC/EU was to opt for the 
Euro?  The answer to these questions depends very much on whether the main 
criterion is path-breaking economic analysis or political savvy. 
 In terms of the former Jenkins’ contribution was very slight.  As noted above 
he was not an out and out economist, even though by the standard of his day he was 
more economically educated than most of his political peers, in the UK at least.  
Thanks partly to the collaboration of Michael Emerson, who drafted most of the La 
Roche paper, and the bulk of the Florence speech, Jenkins was able to become a 
convincing and articulate spokesman for a relaunch of monetary integration.  But his 
plans were deliberately lacking in specifics, reproclaiming the goal, rather than 
mapping out the precise steps needed to get there.  As far as precise economic content 
is concerned, therefore, neither Schmidt’s initiative in the spring of 1978, nor the 
eventual EMS as it emerged in 1979, and still less EMU as it was constructed in the 
1990s, could trace much of their DNA to Jenkins’ or Emerson’s views.  Indeed it is 
perhaps revealing that in the area in which Jenkins (thanks to Emerson) went furthest 
in outlining a specific view of how monetary union should work, namely on the 
question of what sort of central budgetary redistribution might be required, his ideas 
were so totally disregarded that the absence of a large-scale redistributive mechanism 
is now seen by many as one of the major flaws in the manner in which the single 
currency was established.  This neglect began during the EMS negotiations 
themselves, where ‘concurrent studies’ fell far short of initial hopes and expectations; 
it went further in the early 1990s, when the 1993 ‘Stable Money – Sound Finances’ 
report scaled down the degree of fiscal stabilization that MacDougall had foreseen; 
and it was confirmed by an implementation of monetary union that downplayed this 
aspect of EMU even more than the 1993 report. (European Commission, 1993) 
 If EMU is analysed as a political process, however, rather than simply as an 
economic objective, several of Jenkins’ insights seem much more relevant with 
hindsight.  The former President does therefore seem to have been correct to regard 
EMU instrumentally, and to perceive it as a mechanism by which to push European 
integration forward more generally, every bit as much as it was a worthwhile goal in 
its own right.  As such Jenkins’ views accurately foreshadowed those of leaders like 
Helmut Kohl or François Mitterrand who were directly associated with the birth of the 
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Euro.  They too, to put it flippantly, were more interested in ‘a Europe made of 
money’ than specifically in a ‘money made by Europe’.  And instrumental thinking of 
a similar sort helps explain the evident belief of more recent European leaders that to 
protect the Euro during its recent difficulties was also to protect the whole process of 
European integration. 
 Equally prescient was Jenkins’ emphasis on the idea of a qualitative leap, of 
the big idea, rather than that of cautious and gradualist advance.  To be sure, the leap 
made in 1978 or 1979 was not nearly as large nor as far-reaching as the Commission 
President might have wished, hence Mourlon-Druol’s conclusion that Jenkins hope 
for a qualitative leap forward had ‘already virtually faded away’ by November 
1977.(Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p. 160) Similarly, it can be argued that the EMS as it 
eventually came into being bore more than a passing resemblance to the Snake that it 
ostensibly replaced, albeit with a crucial difference in terms of its membership.  This 
too might suggest the triumph of Ortoli’s gradualist inclinations rather than Jenkins’ 
bolder aspirations. But viewed politically such criticisms rather miss the point, since 
the purpose of proclaiming a bold leap was not necessarily to bring this about straight 
away but rather to revitalise a debate that was in danger of becoming either ritualistic 
or confined to academic experts. A cautious manifesto would not have had the same 
effect.  It was therefore vital that both Jenkins’ public speeches and his advocacy for 
monetary union at European Council were pitched in a fashion that excited interest 
and enthusiasm, not bored lip service. And on this too there are important similarities 
between the manner in which Jenkins aimed to gain attention by outlining an 
ambitious and bold target, and Jacques Delors’ modus operandi first on the Single 
Market and subsequently on monetary union (see Dermot Hodson’s chapter in this 
volume). 
Jenkins’ third, and perhaps most important, insight was his identification of 
the European Council as the crucial forum within which the case for monetary 
advance needed to be made. Had the debate about EMU in the 1970s remained 
primarily confined to the level of ECOFIN and the Monetary Committee – the levels 
at which Ortoli most naturally operated – it is, I think, safe to say that precisely 
nothing of significance would have resulted.  Both the ministers of finance and the 
central bank governors had held multiple previous discussions of these topics with 
little concrete result, and it is difficult to see why the situation would have been any 
different in 1977-78.  But by raising the campaign to European Council level Jenkins 
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helped encourage bigger players still, like Schmidt and Giscard, to seize the initiative, 
largely sidelining in the process the many ministry of finance or central bank officials 
who harboured substantial doubts about monetary integration.  Again this has 
contemporary echoes.  Wolfgang Schäuble commented in 2010 that the survival of 
the Euro was Chefsache – i.e. something on which the heads of government rather 
than their ministers of finance would have the final word. (Ludlow, 2010, p. 16) One 
of Jenkins’ great merits was to recognise this aspect of monetary integration as early 
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